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RecognitionMethods
Itis hard to get evidence on the comparative success of different
methods of recognizing cyclical turns, because all analysts are to some
extent eclectic. Two main methods, however, can be distinguished in
principle and sometimes in practice as well. Perhaps the most popular
method of forecasting uses the national income framework. Separate
provisional forecasts are made for the components of GNP. These are
added and revised in the light of any discrepancies between the total and
the assumptions underlying the provisional forecasts. Such a forecast
may yield a prediction of a turning point, especially if it is a quarterly
multiperiod forecast.4° The other principal method uses the business
cycle indicators. Besides these two well-recognized methods, the quantity
theory of money can be and sometimes is used as a basis for forecasting
turning points. And it is possible to forecast without any recognizable
method at all other than interpretation of available data with the help
of theory, experience, judgment, and intuition.
Since the discussions of turning points by the eight analysts in our
main group were mostly informal, I cannot tell to what extent they
relied on national income models, on the indicators, or on something
else. For want of more knowledge and a better name, I shall refer to
them as "eclectic." Two other publications, available for only part of the
period under study here, relied heavily on business cycle indicators. In
addition, Victor Zarnowitz has generously furnished me with data
based on multiperiod forecasts of GNP (mostly quarterly). There is a
presumption that Zarnowitz' forecasters relied more heavily on national
income models than the two in my sample who used the indicators.
40Theeconometric method may be regarded in principle as a variant of this
method, since econometric forecasts commonly use the national income frame-
work. Because data for assessing the recognition record of the econometric
method is meager, I shall not discuss it further. The accuracy of econometric
forecasts is, however, being studied by Jon Cunnyngham as a part of the National
Bureau's project.40 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
Data for both users of the indicators approach can be had for only
four turns (1957—61). Comparison of the average scores of these two
with the eight eclectics for the four turns together conceals such diversity
that its value is doubtful.4' Suffice it to say that the comparison does not
establish any striking differences in the success of the two groups.
Although the average scores of the two and the eight do not display
marked differences for the four turns between 1957 and 1961 taken
together, the same is not true for individual turns. In 1957 (see Chart
1-8), the two using the indicators approach scored better on degree of
certainty than the other eight in nine out of the ten months scored, and
during the early months the difference was marked.42 The inaccurate
statistical information on inventory investment in 1957 affected users of
national income analysis more than those who put their faith in business
cycle
Whereas the two relying heavily on the indicators scored better with
respect to degree of certainty than the eight in 1957, the following year
it was the other way round (see Chart 1-9). In this case, a scrap of addi-
4]. The two users of indicators had average scores for accuracy of dating a
shade higher than the average of the eight eclectics during the three months be-
fore the four turns (between 1957 and 1961). Their forecasts of dating were
markedly worse at and immediately after the turn, but during the period from
three to six months after the reference dates, their scores for accuracy of dating
were considerably higher. These results give no evidence that the indicators are
especially helpful in determining dating contemporaneously with cyclical turns.
The suggestion that the indicators have considerable value some months after
the turn is subject to the qualification that many of the other analysts lacked
interest in the question of dating. They were concerned with whether a peak or
trough had occurred; exactly when it occurred did not matter. The very decision
to use the indicators may imply a greater interest in the subject.
The publications relying on the indicators had average scores for degree of
certainty slightly higher than the eight eclectics, but not enough higher, in view
of the shortcomings of the scoring procedures, to warrant anything in the way
of conclusions about recognition methods (except, perhaps, the speculation that
recognition depends more on the judgment of the analyst than on the specific
methods he uses).
42 Both groups did poorly with respect to accuracy of dating in 1957. Which did
worse depends on whether the mean or the median is used for the eight, the
median being zero in every single month. One of the two users of indicators had
poor scores (mostly zeroes) because he consistently dated the peak much too
early. The other one first predicted a date much too late and thereafter ignored
the subject.
Although inventory investment is now one of the NBER leading indicators,
it was not put on the list until 1960 (Moore, Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. I,
p. 55). What is more to the point, the indicator approach, which uses a sub-
stantial number of series without formally weighting them, is less likely to be
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Recognition Patterns of Business Analysis
CHART 1-9
Recognition Scores in the Vicinity of the 1958 Trough.
Comparison of Indicators Approach with Eclectic Approach
8 analysts (eclectic approach)
2 analysts (indicalors approach)
"Best" eclectic
SOURCE: Appendix I, Table G
model and (2) his low confidence that the upturn would materialize
was based on the NBER indicators, which did not look good to him.
In 1960 (Chart 1-10), those using the indicators again outscored the
other eight, this time in accuracy of dating as well as in degree of cer-
tainty. Although in February and March they succeeded no better than
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the others in anticipating the turn, later on they were more alert to early
signs that it was already past. But they did not do as well as the three
other economists alluded to earlier in footnote 31, two of whom on the
basis of Federal
of 1959.
Reserve policy called the turn as early as the spring
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CHART I-li
Recognition Scores in the Vicinity of the 1961 Trough:
Comparison of Indicators Approach with Eclectic Approach
8analysts (eclectic approach)
2 analysts (indicators approach)
"aest" eclectic
SOURCE: Appendix I, Table I.
In 1961 (Chart I-li),the eight eclectics outscored thetwo relying
on indicators with respect to both accuracy and certainty.
sum, if dubious evidence can be believed, the indicators seem
quicker than eclectic methods to give warning of downturns and slower
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look. The eight eclectics in general scored higher at troughs than peaks,
a result consistent with the hypothesis that they inclined toward op-
timism. (Reading the forecasts of the "best" of the eight gives a strong
impression of an optimistic bias on its part. Compare Charts 1-8 and
1-10 with 1-9 and I-li.) Those forecasters who decided to put their
faith largely in business cycle indicators may have done so because by
temperament and training they were inclined to think in terms of peaks
and troughs. (Reading the forecasts of one of the two gives a strong
impression of a watch for the next peak as soon as the trough is past.)
The two may not have shared the optimistic outlook of the others.44
But the two may not be representative of users of the indicators, and
the eight may have used indicators more heavily than appears to have
been the case. Firm conclusions cannot be reached about methods where
individual judgment is as important as in forecasting.
Let us turn now to a comparison of Zarnowitz' sample with mine.
Zarnowitz has provided data for four sets of forecasts (A, C, D, and G,
as he designates them). Two of the sets represent company forecasts of
GNP. The other two result from averaging the GNP forecasts of groups
of economists who made their forecasts simultaneously and on a com-
parable basis. Altogether there are twenty-four forecasts made in the
vicinity of actual cyclical turns, yielding thirty-six observations (since
these are multiperiod forecasts, the same forecast may predict—or not
predict—two actual turns occurring close together). In addition, there
are six forecasts yielding seven observations of predicted turns that did
not occur. Since the forecasts were made at rather infrequent intervals,
itisnot possible to trace the pattern of increasing recognition in
Zarnowitz' sample nor to make a complete comparison with mine.
I scored the thirty-six observations pertaining to actual turns for both
accuracy of timing and degree of confidence. There was a minor dif-
ficulty with scoring for timing,45 and a major one with scoring for cer-
The certainty scores, which are better indicators of outlook than dating
scores, bear out this speculation. The average certainty scores for the two fore-
casters relying on business cycle indicators were virtually the same for the two
peaks together as for the two troughs, whereas for the eight eclectics the average
was markedly higher at the two troughs. On accuracy of dating the two using
the indicator approach scored markedly higher at the two troughs than at the
two peaks, but the disparity was not as great as for the eight eclectics.
For example, one forecast was for a trough in the second quarter of 1958.
Since the NBER trough came in April, mechanical application of our methods
would have yielded a score of 100, the highest possible. But the actual trough46 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
tainty. All that can be inferred with respect to certainty is whether the
score should be above or below 50. If there was a turn in the numerical
forecasts of GNP, it could be inferred that the forecaster thought a
cyclical turning point was more likely than not, and vice versa, but
greater precision was not possible. Another difficulty was that a number
of the forecasts in Zarnowitz' sample were made in months for which
we did not score our sample.
For two or three of the observations, the average scores for my
sample were higher than for Zarnowitz'.46 In twelve cases, Zarnowitz'
scored higher. In the remaining 21 or 22 cases, there was no way to
tell which group deserved the higher score.
It appears, therefore, that Zarnowitz' forecasters had greater success
in predicting cyclical turns than mine. Such a conclusion, however, rests
on a very flimsy foundation. Besides the inadequacies of the data already
mentioned, Zarnowitz has found that the mean of a group of forecasts
of GNP is superior to most of the individual forecasts entering into the
average. Scoring averages for his two groups (in one case the mean, in
the other the median) may result in higher scores than would be ob-
tained by averaging scores for each individual forecast in the group.
If we take at face value the conclusion that the forecasters in Zarno-
witz' sample were better at recognizing cyclical turns than mine, the
superiority may be associated not with a difference of methods but with
the facts that (1) my group all published their forecasts, a circumstance
that might induce caution about asserting a change in direction, and
(2) Zarnowitz' made quantitative, multiperiod forecasts of GNP, a cir-
cumstance that kept them from taking refuge in verbal ambiguity.
Of the six forecasts of turns that did not occur in Zarnowitz' sample,
one was made in December 1946 for a peak in the second half of that
year, one was made in January 1956 for a peak in the first quarter and
a trough in the third, and the other four were made in 1962—63. Since
the indicators misled some forecasters in both 1956 and 1962—63,
there is little ground here for inferring which method is superior with
respect to avoiding false signals.
in GNP came not in the second quarter but in the first, so the score given was
reduced to 75.
48 Inone case, a different result is obtained depending on whether my sample
is deemed to consist of the eight eclectics only or of all ten publications.